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Mahdi Taheri, Khashayar Khorasani, Iman Shames, and Nader Meskin
Abstract—In this paper, the problem of simultaneous cyber
attack and fault detection and isolation (CAFDI) in cyber-
physical systems (CPS) is studied. The proposed solution
methodology consists of two filters on the plant and the
command and control (C&C) sides of the CPS and an un-
known input observer (UIO) based detector on the plant
side. Conditions under which the proposed methodology can
detect deception attacks, such as covert attacks, zero dynamics
attacks, and replay attacks are characterized. An advantage
of the proposed methodology is that one does not require
a fully secured communication link which implies that the
communication link can be compromised by the adversary
while it is used to transmit the C&C side observer estimates.
Also, it is assumed that adversaries have access to parameters of
the system, filters, and the UIO-based detector, however, they
do not have access to all the communication link channels.
Conditions under which, using the communication link cyber
attacks, the adversary cannot eliminate the impact of actuator
and sensor cyber attacks are investigated. To illustrate the
capabilities and effectiveness of the proposed CAFDI method-
ologies, simulation case studies are provided and comparisons
with detection methods that are available in the literature are
included to demonstrate the advantages and benefits of our
proposed solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are monitored and con-
trolled by distributed sensors, actuators, and embedded com-
puters that are connected via communication networks [1].
Our today’s life massively depends on CPS due to their
wide range of applications in different areas, such as power
systems and smart grid, next generation aerospace and trans-
portation systems, and process control and water treatment
networks [2]. Through employing CPS for these applications
provide us with unique capabilities to accomplish high level
performance and reliability performing complex tasks [3].
Anomalies and machine induced faults as well as ma-
licious cyber attacks in physical components of CPS do
occur and are observed in actuators and sensors. In recent
years, cyber security challenges in CPS, that include cyber
attacks on communication networks have attracted significant
interest [2]–[7]. Nevertheless, the problem of simultaneous
diagnosis of cyber attacks and faults has not been fully
addressed in the literature.
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A special type of cyber attack is defined as the deception
attack in which an adversary changes the transmitted infor-
mation of the system’s input or output by compromising the
CPS network communication channels. This paper studies
the cyber attack and fault detection and isolation (CAFDI)
problem of CPS in presence of machine induced faults as
well as malicious deception cyber attacks, such as covert
attacks, zero dynamics attacks, and replay attacks. Covert
attacks and zero dynamics attacks are defined as undetectable
attacks [8]–[10], since they have no impact on the received
output measurements on the command and control (C&C)
side of the CPS.
A number of researchers have attempted to directly apply
fault detection methods to detect cyber attacks, however,
there is an inherent difference between machine induced
faults and cyber attacks anomalies. Faults represent structural
physical anomalies in the system, whereas cyber attacks are
injected intentionally by an intelligent adversary with the
purpose of damaging the nominal behavior of the system.
Standard fault detection algorithms, such as unknown input
observer (UIO) [11], have been used as tools to detect
cyber attacks. There is an inherent differences between faults
and cyber attacks, where faults follow and are governed by
laws of physics and are associated with physical system
properties. On the other hand, cyber attacks are intelligently
designed and do not necessarily follow physical system
degradations. Consequently, conventional fault diagnosis al-
gorithms should be fundamentally generalized to accommo-
date the malicious intelligent adversary cyber attacks threats.
As a brief overview, the geometric-based fault detection
methodologies were proposed in [12], [13] to obtain neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for existence of observers that
can be used to generate a residual signal for the purpose of
fault detection and isolation (FDI). In addition to geometric
approaches, many algebraic model-based FDI methods have
been introduced, such as UIO [14], [15], interacting multiple
model [16], multiple model [17], [18], distributed detection
algorithms [19]–[21], and parity equation based approaches
[22], [23].
For the cyber attack detection problem, a periodic modu-
lation scheme with the idea of changing the behavior of the
control input was proposed in [24] to detect covert and zero
dynamics attacks in CPS. However, by using this method a
fault in the system can misleadingly be detected as a cyber
attack. A method to detect covert attacks in a network of
interconnected subsystems using the received information
from subsystems was introduced in [25]. However, it was
assumed that the communication links among the subsystems
are fully secured, which is not always feasible in real-world
systems.
In [26] geometric theory was used to define zero dynamics
attacks and show their impact on the system, and proposed
to add perturbations to the system matrices of the system
(A,B,C) to change the zero dynamics of the system so
that the adversary can no longer excite these new zero
dynamics modes. However, in a zero dynamics cyber attack,
the adversary has a complete knowledge of the system,
2therefore, after changing the characteristics of the system
one would still be able to discover the new matrices and
dynamics.
In [27], a sensor coding method was proposed that reveals
stealthy false data injection attacks by changing the direction
of cyber attacks where an algorithm to compute the coding
matrices was designed, and finally, a time-varying coding
approach was developed for the case when the adversary is
capable of estimating a static coding matrix. As a drawback
of this approach, it should be noted that one is also not
capable of isolating faults and cyber attack signals and
anomalies.
The authors in [28] developed a moving target approach
in which certain time-varying external dynamics are added
to the system. Leveraging the moving target approach, the
extended dynamics of the system become unknown to ad-
versaries and they no longer are capable of executing covert
attacks and replay attacks. However, zero dynamics attacks
cannot be detected by using the moving target approach.
In [29], the system was augmented by adding switching
auxiliary dynamics that are unknown to the adversary and a
switched Luenberger observer was designed to detect covert
and zero dynamics attacks, however, for implementation
purposes the extended system and the switched observer need
to be synchronized.
Due to stealthiness of covert and zero dynamics attacks, it
is of paramount importance to develop methods that can be
used to detect and isolate them. In addition, due to existence
of physical component faults in CPS, one needs to also
clearly detect and isolate both faults and cyber attacks in
these systems. This paper aims at addressing the problem of
CAFDI in CPS.
In our proposed methodology, two filters are designed
on both the plant side and the C&C side of the CPS that
are interconnected via communication links that can be
compromised by the adversary. Moreover, on the plant side
UIO-based detectors are designed to generate residuals for
detecting and isolating actuator cyber attacks, sensor cyber
attacks, as well as actuator faults, and sensor faults while the
adversary have a complete knowledge of the filters and UIO-
based detectors. Any type of detectable and undetectable
cyber attacks can be detected by using our proposed method-
ology, however, we have assumed that the adversary does
not have access to all the communication channels among
the filters.
By utilizing both the filters and detectors, we propose and
derive conditions under which an adversary that performs
cyber attack on the communication link channels cannot
eliminate the impacts of actuator and sensor attacks.
To summarize, the main contributions of this paper are
stated as follows:
1) A distributed filter design methodology based on ob-
serving the system from both the plant side and the
C&C side is introduced and developed that can be
utilized to detect and isolate both cyber attacks and
machine induced faults.
2) By utilizing our proposed methodology, undetectable
cyber attacks such as covert attacks and zero dynamics
attacks, as well as detectable attacks such as replay
attacks can be detected and isolated.
3) Based on both the plant side and the C&C side
estimation and observation methodology, conditions
under which isolation among actuator cyber attacks
and sensor cyber attacks are provided and developed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A
mathematical model of the system that takes into account
faults and cyber attacks, the definition of undetectable at-
tacks, and the main objective of this paper are provided in
Section II. In Section III, our proposed CAFDI methodology
that consists of two side filters, the UIO-based detector
and residual signals are developed and investigated. Design
conditions for the filters and detector are proposed and
developed. To illustrate and demonstrate the capabilities of
our analytical results, numerical simulation case studies are
presented in Section IV. Conclusions are provided in Section
V.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND FORMULATION
A. The Cyber-Physical System (CPS) Model
In this paper, a strictly proper linear time-invariant (LTI)
CPS of the form given below is studied:
x˙s(t) =Asxs(t) +Bsu∗(t) + L1f1(t) +N
sωs(t),
yp(t) =C
sxs(t) + L2f
s
2(t) + ν
s(t), (1)
where xs(t) ∈ Rn represents the state, yp(t) ∈ R
p denotes
the measured output on the plant side, u∗(t) ∈ Rm denotes
the control input, f1(t) ∈ R
mf and f s2(t) ∈ R
pf correspond
to actuator and sensor faults, respectively. Moreover, ωs(t) ∈
R
m and νs(t) ∈ Rp denote zero mean wide-sense stationary
(WSS) random Gaussian processes that represent process
and measurement noise with the covariance matrices Q
and R, respectively. The quadruple (As, Cs, Bs, N s) has
appropriate dimensions and describe the CPS characteristics,
and the known pair (L1, L2) capture the fault signatures.
In case of injection of a cyber attack on actuators, the
control input is expressed and changed to
u∗(t) = u(t) + Saau(t), (2)
where u(t) ∈ Rm represents the control command which
is the output of the C&C, au(t) ∈ R
ma denotes a vector
describing the effects of unknown cyber attacks on actuators,
and Sa is a matrix of appropriate dimension which indicates
the control input channels that are under attack.
The output of the CPS on the C&C side when sensors are
under cyber attack can be expressed as
y∗(t) = Csxs(t) + L2f
s
2(t) +Daay(t) + ν
s(t), (3)
where y∗(t) ∈ Rp denotes the output, ay(t) ∈ R
pa denotes
the attack signal, and the known matrix Da describes the
sensor attack signature. A CPS in presence of both the
actuator and sensor cyber attacks is depicted in Fig. 1.
Equations (1) and (2) provide a state space realization of
the CPS from the C&C side in the following form:
x˙s(t) =Asxs(t) +Bsu(t) +Bsaau(t) + L1f1(t) +N
sωs(t),
(4)
where Bsa = B
sSa is to be interpreted as the actuator cyber
attack signature.
In (2) and (3), au(t) and ay(t) denote the impacts of the
adversary’s attack on the control input and output of the CPS,
respectively. The signals au(t) and ay(t) can be arbitrarily
changed by the malicious adversary. In presence of au(t)
and ay(t), the adversary intends to inflict maximum possible
damage on the components of the system while simultane-
ously remaining undetected. The following definitions are
needed in the remainder of the paper.
Definition 1 (Weakly Unobservable Subspace [30]): Let
us denote the CPS by Σ = (As, Bs, Bsa, L1, N
s, Cs, L2, Da).
Under the fault free scenario f1(t) = 0 and f
s
2(t) = 0,
the noise free scenario ωs(t) = 0 and νs(t) = 0, and the
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Fig. 1. Cyber-physical system under deception attack on both input and
output channels, where u(t) denotes the control command, au(t) represents
the cyber attack signal on the input channel, u∗(t) represents the control
input of the plant, yp(t) denotes the output on the plant side, ay(t) denotes
the attack signal on the output channel, and y∗(t) denotes the output on
the C&C side.
cyber attack free scenario au(t) = 0 and ay(t) = 0, a point
xs(0) = xs0 ∈ R
n is called weakly unobservable if there
exists an input function u(t) such that the output satisfies
y∗(t) = 0, ∀ t ≥ 0. The set of all weakly unobservable
points is called weakly unobservable subspace and is
denoted by V (Σ).
Let us denote X s(xs(0), u(t), au(t), ay(t))
as the solution to (4) under the fault free
condition, and Y (xs(0), u(t), au(t), ay(t)) =
CsX s(xs(0), u(t), au(t), ay(t)) as the corresponding
output of the CPS, ∀ t ≥ 0.
Definition 2 (Undetectable Cyber Attacks [9]): Given
xs(0) = xs0, in the CPS (4) under the fault free
scenario, the cyber attack on actuators and sensors
using au(t) 6= 0 and ay(t), is designated as undetectable if
Y (xs0, u(t), au(t), ay(t)) = Y (x
s
0, u(t), 0, 0), ∀t ≥ 0.
In the same manner as described in [13], [31], the sensor
fault and sensor noise can be represented by pseudo actuator
fault and pseudo process noise, respectively. It is worth
noting that in this representation, as described below, sensor
faults are mapped into and represented by pseudo actuator
faults.
Towards the above end, the following auxiliary invertible
LTI system that is driven by the appropriate f2(t), which rep-
resents the pseudo actuator fault, and ωa(t), which captures
the pseudo process noise, is expressed as:
x˙a(t) = Aaxa(t) + La2f2(t) +N
aωa(t),
Caxa(t) = L2f
s
2(t) + ν
s(t),
(5)
where xa(t) ∈ Rpf+p, f2(t) ∈ R
pf , and ωa(t) ∈ Rp. By
incorporating the dynamics of (4) and (5), one can obtain
the augmented and extended CPS in the following form:
x˙(t) =Ax(t) +Bu(t) +Baau(t) + F1f1(t) + F2f2(t)
+Nω(t),
y∗(t) =Cx(t) +Daay(t), (6)
where x(t) = [xs(t)⊤, xa(t)⊤]⊤, A = diag(As, Aa),
B = [Bs⊤, 0m×(pf+p)]
⊤, Ba = [B
s
a
⊤, 0ma×(pf+p)]
⊤,
F1 = [L1
⊤, 0mf×(pf+p)]
⊤, F2 = [0pf×n, L
a
2
⊤]⊤, N =
diag(N s, N a), ω(t) = [ωs(t)⊤, ωa(t)⊤]⊤, and C = [Cs, Ca].
It should be noted that the defined output y∗(t) in (3) is equal
to the one that is given by (6), however, the representations
are different.
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Fig. 2. Observers/filters on both the plant side and the C&C side of the
CPS, where zc(t) represents the states of the C&C side filter, zp(t) denotes
the states of the plant side filter, ac(t) denotes the cyber attack on the
communication link channels, and res(t) denotes the residual signals that
are generated on the plant side.
B. Objectives
Our main objective in this paper is to address the si-
multaneous cyber attack and fault detection and isolation
(CAFDI) problem for the CPS (6) by designing a bank of
observers such that each set of residual signals corresponding
to observers is sensitive and specified to detect one specific
type of anomaly, namely either an actuator cyber attack au(t),
a sensor cyber attack ay(t), an actuator fault f1(t), and/or a
pseudo actuator fault f2(t), while each residual is decoupled
from all the other anomalies.
Decoupling the residuals from one another implies that
occurrence of anomalies only affect those residual signals
that are designated to them. We also do not limit our focus
to detecting only detectable attacks, such as replay attacks.
Our goal and objective is to further detect the so-called unde-
tectable cyber attacks in sense of Definition 2, namely cyber
attacks such as covert and zero dynamics. To accomplish our
objectives we assume that the adversary cannot compromise
all the communication channels among the proposed plant
side and C&C side filters, although they have a complete
knowledge of parameters of the filters and detectors.
III. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
The presence of network layer in CPS has enabled ma-
licious adversaries to perform cyber attacks on the entire
system. On the other hand, due to existence of this network
layer, it is possible to observe the CPS from both the plant
side and its C&C side. The idea of observing the CPS from
both the plant side and the C&C side is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Our goal in this framework is to utilize information from the
designed filters on both sides via a communication link and
generate residuals that are specifically sensitive to faults and
cyber attacks. Using these residuals, the isolation between
faults or cyber attacks can also be achieved.
Two filters having the same characteristics on both sides
are designed in Subsections III-A and III-B. By using the
communication link, states of the C&C side filter are trans-
mitted to the plant side to generate residual signal that is
sensitive to only cyber attacks while this communication link
may still be compromised by an adversary.
A detector on the plant side that utilizes an unknown
input observer (UIO) is designed in the Subsection III-C.
The detector utilizes the previously generated residuals as
4additional input so that they are sensitive to both cyber
attacks and faults. The reason for selecting UIO as the main
detector is that it enables one to utilize a general design
structure to simultaneously address the considered CAFDI
problems.
Other algebraic-based observer design techniques, such
as eigenstructure assignment and Kalman filters have cer-
tain limitations such as not having a flexible structure and
requiring high computational cost. For instance, to isolate
different types of cyber attacks and faults using Kalman
filters, one needs to design and associate a large number
of multiple models of Kalman filters on both sides of the
CPS, which is computationally excessive and increases the
risks and vulnerabilities exploited by intelligent malicious
adversaries to inject cyber attacks.
Our proposed methodology is presented in the Subsection
III-D. It is worth noting that by utilizing the proposed
methodology, one is still capable of detecting any kind of
stealthy cyber attacks on the system, such as covert attacks
and zero dynamics attacks.
A. Command & Control side filter
From the C&C side and according to (6), the output of
the CPS is governed by
y∗(t) = Cx(t) +Daay(t). (7)
We have the following standing assumption to be considered
throughout this paper.
Assumption 1: Only the communication channels can be
compromised and attacked. Consequently, on the C&C side
one has access to the control signal, u(t), before its manip-
ulation by the adversary.
The proposed filter on the C&C side can be expressed as
follows:
z˙ℓc(t) = F
ℓ
p z
ℓ
c(t) + TpBu(t) +K
ℓ
py
∗(t), (8)
where zℓc(t) ∈ R
n represents the filter state that estimates
xs(t) from the C&C side, and the matrices F ℓp , T
ℓ
p , and K
ℓ
p
are of appropriate dimensions that are designed and selected
subsequently. The index ℓ ∈ {SA,AA, SF,AF}, designates
if the filter is designed for detecting sensor attacks, actuator
attacks, sensor faults, and actuator faults, respectively.
B. Plant side filter
On the plant side, sensor measurements are carried out
before sensor attacks, and the output of CPS can be expressed
as follows:
yp(t) = Cx(t).
Moreover, on this side one has access to the potentially
manipulated control signal u∗(t) = u(t) + Saau(t).
The proposed filter on the plant side is expressed in the
following form:
z˙ℓp(t) =F
ℓ
p z
ℓ
p(t) + T
ℓ
pBu
∗(t) +Kℓpyp(t) + L
ℓ
p(z
ℓ
p(t)
− (zℓc(t) +Dacac(t))),
(9)
where zℓp(t) ∈ R
n denotes the filter state estimating xs(t)
from the plant side, ac(t) ∈ R
nc denotes the cyber attack
on the communication link between the two filters with the
signature Dac. Similar to the C&C side filters, the index
ℓ ∈ {SA,AA, SF,AF}, indicates if the filter is designed for
detecting sensor attacks, actuator attacks, sensor faults, and
actuator faults, respectively.
The error signals between estimated states for both sides
can be defined as eℓp(t) = z
ℓ
p(t) − z
ℓ
c(t). The state-space
representation of the error dynamics between the two filter
states can be derived as follows:
e˙ℓp(t) =(F
ℓ
p + L
ℓ
p)e
ℓ
p(t) + T
ℓ
pBaau(t)−K
ℓ
pDaay(t)
− LℓpDacac(t).
(10)
It follows from (10) that the error dynamics is only sensitive
to cyber attacks.
C. UIO-based detector and residual signal generation
Consider a UIO-based detector on the plant side having
the following representation:
z˙ℓ(t) =F ℓzℓ(t) + T ℓBu∗(t) +Kℓyp(t) + L
ℓ(zℓp(t)
− (zℓc (t) +Dacac(t))),
xˆℓ(t) =z(t)ℓ +Hℓyp(t),
(11)
where zℓ(t) ∈ R(n+pf+p), and xˆ(t) ∈ R(n+pf+p) de-
notes the estimated states by the detector. The matrices
F ℓ, T ℓ, Kℓ, Lℓ, and Hℓ are of appropriate dimensions and
will be specified subsequently, with ℓ ∈ {SA,AA, SF,AF},
denoting the categories defined previously.
The error between the states of the detector and the CPS
is defined as eℓ(t) = x(t)− xˆℓ(t). Let
resℓ(t) = yp(t)− Cxˆ
ℓ(t) = Ceℓ(t), (12)
denote a residual signal. By selecting Kℓ = Kℓ1 + K
ℓ
2,
F ℓ = A − HℓCA − Kℓ1C, K
ℓ
1 of appropriate dimension,
and Kℓ2 = FH
ℓ, the dynamics associated with eℓ(t) can
now be expressed in the following form:
e˙ℓ(t) =(A−HℓCA−Kℓ1C)e
ℓ(t) + (I − T ℓ −HℓC)(Bu(t)
+Baau(t)) + (I −H
ℓC)F1f1(t) + (I −H
ℓC)F2f2(t)
+ (I −HℓC)Nω(t)− Lℓeℓp(t)− L
ℓDacac(t).
(13)
Definition 3: A cyber attack/fault is detected if the resid-
ual signal resℓ(t) given by (12) exceeds a pre-specified
threshold η > 0 as follows:
‖resℓ(t)‖2 > η.
where ‖.‖2 indicates the Euclidean norm.
Remark 1: To select the threshold η, one may need to
perform Monte Carlo simulation runs for the healthy system,
i.e., for the fault free and cyber attack free system in presence
of external disturbances and noise and choose the maximum
value of ‖res(t)ℓ‖2 as η.
Definition 4 (Decoupled Residual): The residual signal
resℓ(t) given by (12) is decoupled from an anomalous signal
in the set {au(t), ay(t), f1(t), f2(t)} if the dynamics and
trajectory of resℓ(t) is not affected by that anomalous signal.
D. Filters and detector design for cyber attack and fault
detection and isolation objectives
The error dynamics in (10) and (13) can now be aug-
mented as follows:
˙ˇeℓ(t) =Fˇ ℓeˇℓ(t) + Bˇℓu(t) + Bˇℓaau(t) + Fˇ
ℓ
1f1(t) + Fˇ
ℓ
2f2(t)
− Kˇℓpay(t)− Lˇ
ℓac(t) + Nˇ
ℓω(t),
(14)
5where eˇℓ(t) = [eℓ(t)
⊤
eℓp(t)
⊤
]⊤, and
Fˇ ℓ =
[
F ℓ −Lℓ
0 F ℓp + L
ℓ
p
]
, Bˇ =
[
(I − T ℓ −HℓC)B
0
]
,
Bˇℓa =
[
(I − T ℓ −HℓC)Ba
T ℓpBa
]
, Fˇ ℓ1 =
[
(I −HℓC)F1
0
]
,
Fˇ ℓ2 =
[
(I −HℓC)F2
0
]
, Kˇℓp =
[
0
KℓpDa
]
, Lˇℓ =
[
LℓDac
LℓpDac
]
,
Nˇ ℓ =
[
(I −HℓC)N
0
]
,
(15)
where ℓ ∈ {SA,AA, SF,AF}.
Assumption 2: The malicious adversary is aware of the
parameters of filters in (8), (9), and the UIO-based detector
in (11).
Assumption 3: The malicious adversary does not have
access to all the communication channels between the two
side filters, i.e., rank(Dac) < n.
In the following, it is shown that how one can gener-
ate four residual signals resAA(t), resSA(t), resAF(t), and
resSA(t) to detect the actuator cyber attack, the sensor cyber
attack, the actuator fault, and the sensor fault, respectively,
by using a bank of filters and four UIO-based detectors.
Proposition 1: Under Assumption 3, the residual sig-
nal resAA(t) = yp(t) − Cxˆ
AA(t) is affected by the
actuator cyber attack au(t) and is decoupled from ay(t),
f1(t), and f2(t) in the sense of Definition 4, if the following
conditions for the augmented dynamics (14) hold for ℓ =
AA, namely:
1) T ℓ = I −HℓC;
2) (I −HℓC)F1 = 0;
3) (I −HℓC)F2 = 0;
4) LℓDac = 0;
5) LℓpDac = 0;
6) KAAp Da = 0;
7) the triplet (C, F ℓ, Lℓ) is left-invertible;
8) the Rosenbrock system matrix
PΣu(s) =
[
sI − (FAAp + L
AA
p ) −T
AA
p Ba
LAA 0(n+pf+p)×ma
]
,
does not have any non-minimum phase zero dynamics;
9) rank (LAATAAp Ba) = rank (T
AA
p Ba);
10) Fˇ ℓ is Hurwitz.
Proof: The augmented governing error dynamics asso-
ciated with eAA(t) and eAAp (t) are governed by (14) where
ℓ = AA. Under Conditions 1) to 6), the dynamics (14)
become
˙ˇeAA(t) = FˇAAeˇAA(t) + BˇAAa au(t) + Nˇ
AAω(t). (16)
Consequently, the error signal eˇ(t) is not affected by the
control command u(t), the actuator fault f1(t), the sensor
fault f2(t), the sensor attack ay(t), and the communication
link attack signal ac(t). Furthermore, (16) can be partitioned
into the following two subsystems:
e˙AAp (t) = (F
AA
p + L
AA
p )e
AA
p (t) + T
AA
p Baau(t), (17)
and
e˙AA(t) =FeAA(t)− LAAeAAp (t) + (I −H
AAC)Nω(t),
resAA(t) =Ce
AA(t).
(18)
Based on Condition 7) and according to (18), the impact
of eAAp (t) will appear in resAA(t) for any au(t) 6= 0.
Consider eAAp (t) in (17) with the output L
AAeAAp (t) in
order to construct the Rosenbrock system matrix PΣu(s). To
prevent stealthy attacks on the plant side filter, one needs to
design this filter and LAA such that the Rosenbrock system
matrix PΣu(s) has no non-minimum phase zero dynamics
and is left-invertible [8].
The Rosenbrock system matrix PΣu(s) being left-
invertible is equivalent to the largest controllability sub-
space of the system (LAA, FAAp +L
AA
p , T
AA
p Ba) contained in
ker(LAA), and designated as R∗(Σu) being null [30]. One
has (refer to Theorem 8.22 in [30] and Theorem 5.6 in [32])
R
∗(Σu) = V (Σu) ∩W
∗(Σu), (19)
where V (Σu) is the weakly unobservable subspace that is
equivalent to the largest output-nulling subspace of the triplet
(LAA, FAAp + L
AA
p , T
AA
p Ba), and W
∗(Σu) is the smallest
conditioned invariant subspace containing Im(TAAp Ba) [9].
As described in [30] and [32], these subspaces can be
computed by using the following algorithm
V0 = Ker(L
AA),
Vk = V0 ∩ F
AA
p
−1
(Vk−1 + Im(T
AA
p Ba)), (20)
and
W0 = Im(T
AA
p Ba),
Wk = W0 + F
AA
p (Wk−1 ∩ Ker(L
AA)), (21)
where Vk and Wk converge to V (Σu) and W
∗(Σu), respec-
tively, in at most k = n steps.
Given (19), R∗(Σu) = 0, if V0 ∩W0 = 0, or equivalently,
Ker(LAA) ∩ Im(TAAp Ba) = 0. (22)
The equation (22) implies that Im(TAAp Ba) should not be in
the null space of LAA, which is equivalent to
rank (LAATAAp Ba) = rank (T
AA
p Ba).
The Rosenbrock system matrix PΣu(s) being left-
invertible implies that for any au(t) 6= 0, L
AAeAAp (t) 6= 0.
Finally, in order to detect actuator cyber attacks, the
governing dynamics in (16) should be stable. This completes
the proof of the Proposition 1.
Remark 2: It should be emphasized that as per Assump-
tion 3, there exists a nonzero LAA that satisfies the Condition
(4) in the above proposition.
Proposition 2: Under Assumption 3, the residual sig-
nal resSA(t) = yp(t) − Cxˆ
SA(t) is affected by the
sensor cyber attacks ay(t) and is decoupled from au(t),
f1(t), and f2(t) in the sense of Definition 4, if Conditions
1)-5), 7), and 10) of the Proposition 1 for ℓ = SA, and the
following conditions for the augmented error dynamics (14)
hold:
1) T SAp Ba = 0;
2) the Rosenbrock system matrix
PΣy(s) =
[
sI − (F SAp + L
SA
p ) K
SA
p Da
LSA 0(n+pf+p)×pa
]
,
does not have any non-minimum phase zero dynamics;
and
3) rank (LSAKSAp Da) = rank (K
SA
p Da).
Proof: The proof follows along similar lines to that of
Proposition 1 and is omitted for sake of brevity.
6Remark 3: Suppose Condition (9) of the Proposition 1 is
not satisfied and PΣu(s) is not left-invertible. In this case, it
has been shown in [8] that one can find an actuator cyber
attack au(t) 6= 0 such that L
AAeAAp (t) = 0. This type of cyber
attack has been represented in [8] and has been defined as
“undetectable controllable attack” in [9]. According to (17)
and (18) the actuator cyber attack signal au(t) can affect the
error eAA(t) only through LAAeAAp (t). Hence, the adversary
has the capability of injecting a stealthy cyber attack by using
au(t) that does not affect the residual signal resAA(t) =
CeAA(t). Similarly, it can be shown that if Condition (3) of
Proposition 2 is not satisfied and PΣy(s) is not left-invertible,
the adversary can inject stealthy attack using ay(t) which
does not affect the residual resSA(t).
Remark 4: In Propositions 1 and 2, there is no assumption
on the nature, characteristics, and type of sensor and actuator
cyber attacks. This implies that by using the proposed
method, one is capable of detecting and isolating detectable
attacks, such as replay attacks, as well as undetectable attacks
(refer to Definition 2), such as covert attacks and zero
dynamics attacks.
Proposition 3: Let ℓ = AF . The residual signal
resAF(t) = yp(t)−Cxˆ
AF(t) is affected by the actuator fault
f1(t) and is decoupled from au(t), ay(t), and f2(t) in
the sense of Definition 4, if LAF = 0 and the following
conditions hold:
1) TAF = I −HAFC;
2) (I −HAFC)F2 = 0;
3) FˇAF is Hurwitz.
Proof: In light of Conditions 1) and 2), and setting
ℓ = AA, (14) yields
˙ˇeAF(t) =FˇAFeˇAF(t) + BˇAFa au(t) + Fˇ
AF
1 f1(t)− Kˇ
AF
p ay(t)
− LˇAFac(t) + Nˇ
AFω(t).
Moreover, by setting LAF = 0, the dynamics of eAF(t) is
governed by:
e˙AF(t) = FAFeAF(t) + (I −HAFC)F1f1(t) +Nω(t).
and consequently, the residual signal resAF(t) = Ce
AF(t) is
only sensitive to the actuator fault f1(t). In addition, Fˇ
AF
should be Hurwitz in order to have a stable error dynamics
eAF(t). This completes the proof of the Proposition 3.
Proposition 4: The residual signal resSF(t) = yp(t) −
CxˆSF(t) is affected by the pseudo actuator fault f2(t) and
is decoupled from au(t), ay(t), and f1(t) in the sense of
Definition 4, if LSF = 0 and the following conditions for the
augmented dynamic (14) hold:
1) T SF = I −HSFC;
2) (I −HSFC)F1 = 0;
3) Fˇ SF is Hurwitz.
Proof: Setting ℓ = SF, the proof follows along similar
lines to that of Proposition 3 and is omitted for sake of
brevity.
As stated in [14], Conditions 2) and 3) in Proposition
1 are solvable if and only if rank(CF1) = rank(F1); and
rank(CF2) = rank(F2). The next lemma provides sufficient
conditions for isolability of sensors and actuator faults.
Theorem 1: The residuals resAF(t) and resSF(t) can be
simultaneously generated to detect and isolate f1(t) and
f2(t) if F
⊤
1 F2 = 0.
Proof: In order to generate the residual signal resAF(t)
Condition 2) in Proposition 3 should hold, which can be
interpreted as requiring
Im(I −HAFC) ⊂ Ker(F⊤2 ). (23)
and at the same time, the impact of f1(t) should show up in
the dynamics of e(t), that implies (I −HAFC)F1 6= 0. The
latter condition is equivalent to
Im(F⊤1 ) ⊂ Im(I −H
AFC). (24)
From (23) and (24), it can be inferred that Im(F⊤1 ) ⊂
Ker(F⊤2 ), which implies that F
⊤
1 F2 = 0. Note that the case
of generating the residual signal resSF(t) provides one with
the same result. This completes the proof of the Theorem 1.
It follows from the definitions of F1 and F2 that the
condition F⊤1 F2 = 0 is always satisfied. Therefore, as long
as Conditions (2) and (3) in Proposition 1 are solvable, the
actuator faults and pseudo actuator faults can be detected and
isolated.
Remark 5: To generate the residual signals resAA(t),
resSA(t), resAF(t), and resSF(t) one needs to construct a
bank of eight filters (four on each side) with the states
zAAp (t), z
AA
c (t), z
SA
p (t), z
SA
c (t), z
AF
p (t), z
AF
c (t), z
SF
p (t), and
zSFc (t) and four UIO-based detectors with the states xˆ
AA(t),
xˆSA(t), xˆAF(t), and xˆSF(t) according to Propositions 1-4. In
Propositions 1 and 2, the matrices KAAp and T
SA
p have been
utilized to decouple sensor cyber attacks and actuator cyber
attacks in sense of Definition 4 from the generated residual
signals, respectively. Hence, one can conclude that there is
no contradiction among the conditions to generate resAA(t)
and resSA(t). Subsequently, from Theorem 1 it can be seen
that no contradiction exists among the design conditions in
the Propositions 3 and 4 to generate resAF(t) and resSF(t).
Moreover, in Propositions 3 and 4, the matrix Lℓ has been
employed to decouple the cyber attack signals from resAF(t)
and resSF(t), which indicates that there are no contradictions
in the design conditions of Propositions 1 and 2.
IV. NUMERICAL CASE STUDIES
In this section, numerical case studies are provided to
demonstrate and verify the capabilities and advantages of our
proposed methodology as compared to the available results
in the literature. For these case studies, a bank of filters
and UIO-based detectors are designed to achieve detection
and isolation of cyber attacks as well as faults by using the
proposed methods in the Propositions 1-4. To simulate the
covert and zero dynamics attacks the models in [2] and [1]
are used, respectively.
Two types of cyber attacks are studied, namely covert
attacks and zero dynamics attacks. Moreover, detection and
isolation of simultaneous actuator and sensor bias faults with
cyber attacks are also demonstrated and validated. A linear
dynamical system with the following characteristic matrices
and cyber attack and fault signatures is considered:
As =


−1 0 1 0
0 −3 0 1
0 0 −2 0
0 0 0 −2

 , Bs =


−2 −1
0 −2
0 −3
−4 0

 ,
Cs =
[
0.2 0 0 0
0 0.2 0 0
]
, Bsa =


−2 −1
0 −2
0 −3
−4 0

 ,
L1 =


−2
0
0
−4

 , La2 =
[
1
0
0
]
, Dac =


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

 , N a =
[
0
1
1
]
,
7Aa =
[
−1 0 0
0 −2 0
0 0 −3
]
, Ca =
[
1 1 1
1 1 1
]
, N s =


1
1
1
1

 ,
Da =
[
0.2 0
0 0.2
]
, (25)
where all the input and output channels are compromised
by adversaries as they have access to two out of the four
communication channels. The covariance matrices of ωs(t)
and ωa(t) are specified as Q = diag(0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01)
and Ra = diag(0.02, 0.02), respectively.
For the case studies, the design steps that are summarized
in the Algorithms 1 and 2 in Appendix VI are utilized.
A bank of plant side filters as given by (9), C&C side
filters as presented by (8), and detectors as provided in
(11) are designed such that the conditions of Propositions
1-4 are satisfied. Moreover, the residual signals resAA(t),
resSA(t), resAF(t), and resSF(t) are generated according to
Propositions 1-4, respectively.
Scenario 1 (Zero Dynamics Attacks): The system pre-
sented in (25) has a non-minimum phase zero at s =
0.3028, that is associated with the zero state direction
xs0 = [0, 0, −0.6514, 1]
⊤ and the zero input direction u0 =
[−0.5757, 0.5]⊤. To determine the threshold for the residual
signals resAA(t) and resSA(t) of the actuator and sensor
cyber attacks 100 Monte Carlo simulation runs are conducted
according to Remark 1, and the threshold is determined as
η = 3.3. The parameters of the filters and the UIO-based
detector subject to actuator cyber attack are designed as
follows:
FAAp =


−3 0 0 0
0 −2 0 0
0 0 −4 0
0 0 0 −5

 , TAAp =


1 1 1 1
1 2 3 1
2 0 0 −4
0 1 0 0

 ,
LAAp =


0 0 4 −1
0 0 3 −2
0 0 2 −3
0 0 5 −1

 , HAA =


5 −5
0 0
0 0
10 −10
0 1
0 0
0 0


,
KAA1 =


6 −2
−3 1
6 2
3 1
3 1
6 2
3 1


, LAA =


0 0 4 −1
0 0 3 −2
0 0 2 −3
0 0 5 −1
0 0 3 −2
0 0 2 −3
0 0 5 −1


, KAAp = [0]4×2,
As can be seen in Fig. 3, the residual signal resAA(t) =
yp(t) − Cxˆ
AA(t) that is designed to detect actuator cyber
attacks has increased (due to a zero dynamics attack) while
the other residuals are successfully below the threshold.
Scenario 2 (Covert Attacks): In this scenario, a covert
attack scenario is considered. The adversary is capable of
completely removing the impact of actuator cyber attack
au(t) = [2, 1]
⊤ from the sensor measurements by using the
sensor cyber attack Daay(t) = −Cxcov(t), where x˙cov(t) =
Axcov(t) + Baau(t) and xcov(0) = x(0). The impact of
this cyber attack at t = 10 (s) can be seen on sensor
measurements on the plant side as shown in Fig. 4. However,
the received sensor measurements on the C&C side do not
show any anomaly in outputs. The parameters of the detector
are the same as in Scenario 1, but to detect sensor cyber
attacks a set of filters are designed to satisfy the conditions
that are provided in Proposition 2 to generate resSA(t).
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Fig. 3. Detection of a zero dynamics attack that is injected at t = 0 (s).
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Fig. 4. Difference between output of the system on the plant side and the
C&C side due to injection of covert attack at t = 10 (s).
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Fig. 5. Detection of actuator and sensor cyber attacks in case of covert
attacks.
As shown in Fig. 5, the increase in actuator and sensor
cyber attacks residuals, resAA(t) and resSA(t), respectively,
that exceed the threshold indicate the occurrence of these
cyber attacks.
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Fig. 6. Detection of actuator and sensor faults.
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Fig. 7. Detection and isolation of different simultaneous cyber attacks and
faults.
Scenario 3 (Faults): Using Proposition 3, the UIO-based
detector and its corresponding residual signal resAF(t) that
is sensitive to actuator faults are first designed. Then, based
on conditions in Proposition 4 to detect sensor faults the
matrices for the UIO-based detector and the residual signal
resSF(t) are selected. The threshold for residuals that are
used to detect actuator and sensor faults is computed accord-
ing to the method provided in Remark 1 and is set to η = 0.6.
In this scenario, the actuator fault, f1(t) = 40, has occurred
at t = 5 (s) and the pseudo actuator fault, f2(t) = 20, also
exists in the system from t = 10 (s) onwards. It can be
observed from Fig. 6 that due to occurrence of faults the
corresponding residuals have been increased.
Scenario 4 (Simultaneous Injection of Cyber Attack
and Fault): In this scenario, the detection and isolation of
simultaneous cyber attacks and faults is demonstrated. In this
scenario, the system is under a covert attack at t = 0 (s)
and an actuator fault and sensor faults occur at t = 5 (s)
and t = 10 (s), respectively. As depicted in Fig. 7, these
anomalies can be both detected and isolated successfully.
Scenario 5 (Condition (9) of the Proposition 1 is not
Satisfied): In this scenario, we have intentionally designed
our monitoring system in a manner such that Condition
(9) of the Proposition 1 is not satisfied. Therefore, we can
illustrate its importance in our proposed methodology. In
Fig. 8, it can be seen that when the above condition is
not satisfied the adversary is now capable of performing
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Fig. 8. Residual signals when Condition (9) of the Proposition 1 is not
satisfied.
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Comparison Between the Presented Method in this Paper and th Method in [23]
Fig. 9. False detection of cyber attack by using the proposed method in
[24] while there is only a fault in the system (actuator fault is injected from
t = 5 (s) onwards).
“undetectable controllable attack” (refer to Remark 3 and [9])
on PΣu(s) and completely eliminate or cancel out impacts
of the actuator cyber attack on the residual.
Comparative Study with Results Available in the Liter-
ature: In order to provide a comparison with the existing
results in the literature, the proposed approach in [24] is ap-
plied to our case studies. The following periodic modulation
matrix was developed in [24]:
S(k) =


S1 ; k = 1 (0 ≤ t ≤ t1)
...
ST ; k = T (tT−1 ≤ t ≤ tT )
where S(k) is the modulation matrix on the input,
S1, . . . , ST ∈ R
m×m are constant matrices, and T = m.
The idea in [24] is to disrupt the knowledge of the adversary
from the system by employing the modulation S(k). Using
the detection method in [24], it is shown in Fig. 9 that
despite having no actuator and sensor cyber attacks, the
attack residual signal increases which misleadingly indicates
the existence of cyber attacks (false positive). However,
in the same figure it is shown that by using our pro-
posed method in Propositions 1-4 and generating resAA(t),
resSA(t), resAF(t), and resSF(t), the occurrence of actuator
fault in the system was correctly detected and isolated.
9TABLE I
TPR MEASURE FOR ACTUATOR ATTACK DETECTION ACCORDING TO THE
PROPOSED METHODOLOGY CORRESPONDING TO PROPOSITION 1.
Types of Anomalies TPR% (Proposition 1)
AA 96%
AA & SA 96%
AA & AF 95%
AA & SF 96%
AA & SA & AF 95%
AA & SA & SF 96%
AA & AF & SF 96%
AA & SA & AF & SF 95%
TABLE II
TPR MEASURE FOR SENSOR ATTACK DETECTION ACCORDING TO THE
PROPOSED METHODOLOGY CORRESPONDING TO PROPOSITION 2.
Types of Anomalies TPR% (Proposition 2)
SA 99%
SA & AA 99%
SA & AF 99%
SA & SF 99%
SA & AA & AF 99%
SA & AA & SF 99%
SA & AF & SF 99%
SA & AA & AF & SF 90%
A. Quantitative performance evaluation
Our proposed CAFDI methodologies under different noise
levels are quantitatively evaluated through 100 different
Monte Carlo simulation runs. A confusion matrix [33] is
employed to evaluate the performance of our proposed meth-
ods. Given a classifier and its corresponding instances, four
possible outcomes are specified as (1) TP (True Positive), if
the instance is positive and is truly classified as positive,
(2) FN (False Negative), if the instance is positive and
incorrectly classified as negative, (3) TN (True Negative), if
the instance is negative and correctly classified as negative,
and (4) FP (False Positive), if the instance is negative and
incorrectly classified as positive [33].
Based on the possible outcomes the metric true positive
rate (TPR) which indicates the rate of correct detection is
used as a performance measure in this paper. This perfor-
mance measure can be computed by using the expression
TPR = TP/(TP + FN). In this subsection, “AA”, “SA”,
“AF”, and “SF” are used to denote actuator attack, sensor
attack, actuator fault, and sensor fault, respectively. The
TPR results for the proposed methods that are developed
in Propositions 1-4 for injection of cyber attacks and faults
are presented in Tables I-IV.
The rows in Table I indicate the TPR of actuator attack
(AA) detection given different scenarios for simultaneous
occurrence of anomalies in the system, such as occurrence
of AA and SA, AA and AF, and AA and SF. Furthermore,
the second column in this table shows the computed TPR for
Proposition 1. In Table II the rows show the TPR of sensor
attack (SA) detection in various scenarios for simultaneous
occurrence of anomalies in the system. Moreover, the second
column corresponds to the computed TPR of detection for
SA where Proposition 2 is utilized. In Table III, the computed
TPR of detection of actuator fault (AF) in presence of
different anomalies are shown in the rows. Finally, the rows
in Table IV indicate the TPR for sensor fault (SF) under
simultaneous occurrences of anomalies in the system.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the problem of simultaneous detection and
isolation of machine induced faults and intelligent malicious
TABLE III
TPR MEASURE FOR ACTUATOR FAULT DETECTION ACCORDING TO THE
PROPOSED METHODOLOGY IN PROPOSITION 3.
Types of Anomalies TPR% (Proposition 3)
AF 93%
AF & AA 93%
AF & SA 93%
AF & SF 93%
AF & AA & SA 93%
AF & AA & SF 93%
AF & SA & SF 92%
AF & AA & SA & SF 93%
TABLE IV
TPR MEASURE FOR SENSOR FAULT DETECTION ACCORDING TO THE
PROPOSED METHODOLOGY IN PROPOSITION 4.
Types of Anomalies TPR% (Proposition 4)
SF 96%
SF & AA 96%
SF & SA 96%
SF & AF 96%
SF & AA & SA 96%
SF & AA & AF 96%
SF & SA & AF 96%
SF & AA & SA & AF 96%
adversarial cyber attacks has been studied. A methodology
based on the cyber-physical systems (CPS) two side filters
and a UIO-based detector has been proposed. In this method,
a filter was designed on the plant side with its dynamics dif-
ferent from the C&C side filter so that even if the adversary
estimates the parameters of the C&C side filter they cannot
identify the parameters of the plant side filter. Moreover,
this methodology inhibits adversaries from disguising their
cyber attacks. Using the proposed strategy, one is capable
of simultaneously detecting machine induced actuator and
sensor faults as well as undetectable cyber attacks, such
as covert and zero dynamics attacks, and detectable cyber
attacks, such as the replay attack. In future work we will
consider non-ideal communication networks. Furthermore, to
make the cyber-physical systems model closer to the real-
world applications, we will extend the results of this paper
to a multi-agent based framework.
VI. APPENDIX
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